A Game Theoretical View on Efficiency Wage Theories by Wesselbaum, Dennis
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Game Theoretical View on Efficiency
Wage Theories
Dennis Wesselbaum
The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel University, EABCN
October 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18026/
MPRA Paper No. 18026, posted 20. October 2009 19:37 UTC
A Game Theoretical View on Eﬃciency Wage
Theories*
Dennis Wesselbaum
The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel University, and EABCN
October 20, 2009
Abstract
The eﬃciency wage theory developed by Akerlof (1982) assumes observability
of eﬀort and the ability of ﬁrm and worker to commit on their eﬀort/wage
decisions. We show that, from a game theoretical point of view, we have to
understand the ﬁrm/worker relationship as a repeated Prisoner's dilemma.
Therefore, cooperation is per se not a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium
and hence the Akerlof (1982) theory is based upon an implicit assumption of
cooperation, which can not be implemented w.l.o.g.. In addition, we ﬁnd that
this approach is a special case of the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) approach and
hence unify the two approaches.
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1 Introduction
In order to explain equilibrium unemployment, nobel laureate George A. Akerlof
developed the fair wage theory based on the sociological partial gift exchange ap-
proach (see Akerlof (1982)). This theory explains equilibrium unemployment by
the fact that the wage is above the market clearing wage. The reason for this non-
neoclassical phenomenon is the fact that ﬁrms tend to pay a higher wage in order
to ensure that workers provide a desired amount of eﬀort. In contrast to Akerlof's
idea, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) suggested a diﬀerent type of eﬃciency wage model.
While in Akerlof's model eﬀort is observable1 and measurable, Shapiro and Stiglitz
assume that eﬀort is not observable. Consistently, a worker has an incentive to
shirk, viz. the worker might not provide eﬀort. Under equilibrium full employment,
this would urge the ﬁrm to pay a wage that is above the market clearing wage, in
order to create some punishment for shirking. As a direct consequence, equilibrium
full employment is not feasible, since the higher wage will decrease labor demand
and cause (equilibrium) unemployment. We see that both theories work along the
same dimension, namely increasing the wage above the market clearing wage, but
with diﬀerent causes. However, there are several challenges aicted with Akerlof's
idea in a dynamic context. Especially, the assumption of commitable eﬀort is cru-
cial. Akerlof (1982) states that "Since output is easily observable, it is at least a
bit surprising ... that workers are not paid wages proportional to their outputs."
From our point of view, the observation of each worker is hardly imaginable due
to monitoring costs and the possible negative psychological eﬀects on the workers
motivation. Consistently, and because the ﬁrm/worker pair sets the wage/eﬀort
at the beginning of the period - since the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts and deﬁnes its
plan at the beginning of every period, while the household maximizes utility at the
beginning of the period -, the proportional wage is only a hypothetical construct.2
Let us consider a dynamic version based upon the Akerlof approach.3
The underlying decision process can be deconstructed in the following steps
1. A ﬁrm-worker match exists or is created,
2. Firm's solve their optimization problem,
3. Firm's set the optimal wage,
4. Worker's receive the wage oﬀer and set their eﬀort,
5. Production commences.
We infer that after the ﬁrm and the worker have somehow matched, the ﬁrm max-
imizes its proﬁts and determines the optimal wage/eﬀort decision.4 The worker
1And to be more precisely, it is possible for workers to commit on their eﬀort "gift".
2We would like to emphasize that our analysis is independent from the fact whether output (or
eﬀort) is observable. The main point is the commitability of eﬀort.
3See e.g. Danthine and Donaldson (1990) or Danthine and Kurmann (2004) for the dynamic version
of the Akerlof approach in a RBC, NKM context respectively.
4The model has no endogenous hiring process. Furthermore, frictions are only related to labor
demand. The ﬁrm solves its maximization problem i.a. subject to the eﬀort function, known
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receives the wage and provides the desired amount of eﬀort. Akerlof motivates this
i.a. with the sociological gift exchange, i.e. workers have "sentiments" for the ﬁrm.
However, the other side of the coin is that whenever there is sentiment, there is also
the possibility of being discouraged by ﬁrm's decisions.
We ﬁnd that the implicit assumption of Akerlof (1982) of cooperation being a (sub-
game perfect) Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game does not hold w.l.o.g..
Furthermore, we establish conditions for the (subgame) perfectness of the cooper-
ation strategy for the entire time path of the game. In addition, we ﬁnd that this
approach is a special case of the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) approach and hence
unify the two approaches and provide a game theoretical foundation of eﬃciency
wages.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the basic concepts
of repeated prisoner's dilemma and in section 3, we have a game theoretic view on
the ﬁrm/worker relationship. In section 4 we will draw the conclusion.
2 The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
We consider an inﬁnitely repeated Prisoner`s dilemma5, i.e. the horizon of the
game T is unknown to both players and they both expect the game to be played for
a long period of time. Let us call our game B expressed by a simultaneous-move
matrix. Furthermore, we assume that our game is time-independent and hence
stationary. Let P be the set of players containing the ﬁnite set {1, 2, ..., n}. Our
game starts in period t = 0 and is played every period. We assume that every
player has full information and that actions are revealed to all players before the
next round. With this assumption, we enable players to condition their actions on
the history of events up to point t. In order to avoid the problem of inﬁniteness
of player's payoﬀs, we introduce discounting of future payoﬀs. We understand this
discounting as a measure of time preference.6 In the following, we will discuss
the general mathematical background for later purpose. Let Ut,i denote the utility
function of player i over the outcomes of B in period t. In addition, let φ ∈ (0, 1) be
the time-independent discount rate. Consistently, if the payoﬀs are constant over
B and t, we can write the stream of payoﬀs of player i as
∞∑
t=0
φtU t,i. (1)
to the ﬁrm. Therefore we have the additional assumption of full information or revelation of
information.
5As usual in DSGE models, we assume that both players are inﬁnitely lived.
6Notice that in Akerlof (1982) only static problems are considered. We introduce discounting,
because worker and ﬁrm can not be sure how long the game will continue. For instance, the
worker might expect that in a recession the ﬁrm is more likely to cheat or that the separation
probability increases.
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The average discounted value of the payoﬀ stream is then given by
(1− φ)
∞∑
t=0
φtΓti = (1− φt)Γˆi + φtΓˇi, (2)
where Γti is the constant payoﬀ of player i for t periods and let Γˆi denote the
constant payoﬀ for the ﬁrst t periods, while Γˇi is the diﬀerent payoﬀ for the next t
periods.7 Furthermore, let sti = (s
0
i , s
1
i , ...) denote the history-dependent strategies.
The strategy proﬁle s is the n-tuple of indiviual strategies such that s = (s1, ..., sn).
Now, let us consider a repeated-game between players (i, j) with the two strategies
C and N . A strategy for player i that ensures cooperation is: play C in the ﬁrst
period and in every consecutive period, iﬀ player j always cooperated. However,
play N , iﬀ player j played N in the precedent period. Let player i′s repeated game
strategy be s˜i = (s˜0i , s˜
1
i , ...). Consistently, in period t after history h
t8
s˜ti(h
t) =
C, iﬀ ht = (C,C)t,N, otherwise.
As an illustrative example, consider the following game presented in Table 1.
Table 1: A Prisoner's Dilemma Example
i, j C N
C 1,1 -1,2
N 2,-1 0,0
If both players stick to their cooperation strategy, the payoﬀ computation is
straightforward, resulting 1. Now, let player i deviate from C in period t. For
the ﬁrst t periods, she receives 1 and for period t¯, she receives 2, i.e. the payoﬀ
from (C,N). In any consecutive period t > t¯, both players choose N , i.e. to not
cooperate, and receive 0.9 Using equation (2) yields that,
(1− φ)
∞∑
t=0
φtΓti = (1− φt)Γˆi + φt
(
(1− φ)Γˇi + φΓ˜i
)
, (3)
if player i receives Γˇi only for period t. Consistently, player i′s payoﬀ from deviating
is given by 1 − φt(2φ − 1). Some algebra yields that this cheating strategy is not
proﬁtable, as long as φ ≥ 12 . We have shown that cooperation is a Nash equilib-
rium of the game, if the time preference parameter is above a certain endogenously
determined threshold.
7(1−φ)∑∞t=0 φtΓti = (1− φ)(∑j−1t=0 φtΓti +∑∞t=j φtΓti) = (1− φ)( Γˆi(1−φt)1−φ + Γˇiφt1−φ ) = (1− φt)Γˆi + φtΓˇi,
see Ratliﬀ (1997).
8We assume that for any proﬁle a it holds h0 = (a)0, such that ht = (C,C)t.
9Here, we assume that the punishment for deviating is playing N for any consecutive period. One
might assume diﬀerent punishment strategies, but since we consider a ﬁrm/worker relationship
cheating should result in separation and hence there should be no way back to rebuild the rela-
tionship.
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As a ﬁnal step, we show that cooperation is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
For this purpose, consider a subgame that starts in period tˆ with history htˆ. The
restriction sˆ to the subgame htˆ deﬁnes the strategy in this subgame. The restriction
to this subgame is given by
sˆti(h
tˆ) =
C, iﬀ htˆ = (C,C)tˆ,N, otherwise.
Now, we can identify two classes of histories (i) both players have choosen to co-
operate for the entire game, and (ii) at least one player cheated in at least one of
the previous periods. Then, for class (i) subgames the restriction reduces to the
game strategy derived in (3), because the history up to this subgame has to read as
ht = htˆ = (C,C)t = (C,C)tˆ. Since in (3) s˜ti is a Nash equilibrium, the restriction sˆ
t
i
is a Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle in (i), iﬀ the condition for the discount factor
holds.
In the second class, and by assumption, because one player has choosen to non-
cooperate, both players choose to non-cooperate in the ongoing subgame. It can be
shown, that such a strategy is also a subgame perfect equilibrium and consistently,
that for any subgame the restriction of s˜ti is a Nash equilibrium for that subgame,
iﬀ φ ≥ 12 . Therefore, s˜ti is also a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated
game.
3 The Eﬃciency Wage Pendant
We have shown that in a repeated Prisoner's dilemma cooperation is a (subgame
perfect) Nash equilibrium, iﬀ the discount rate is above a certain threshold. In the
following, we have to show that the eﬃciency wage theory - from a game theoretic
viewpoint - yields such a Prisoner's dilemma. Which variables do we have to con-
sider? The payoﬀs contain the worker's eﬀort e > 0, since the utility function in
Akerlof (1982) has the form u(en, e, w, ), where  represents the worker's taste and
en are the norms of eﬀort. Moreover, eﬀort is a decision variable for the worker
and disregarding eﬀort would lead to a distortion of our results. In addition, we
consider the wage w > 0 - also present in the worker's utility function - to be some
additional payment in case of the achievement of predetermined goals.10 For the
ﬁrm, only output y is considered. We assume that w > e, i.e. that the eﬀort -
given in terms of its share of the wage - is always smaller than the wage. Similarly,
we assume y > w, such that the production process generates proﬁts. Using these
variables yields the following game-matrix presented in Table 2.
10Those goals are written down in the contract between ﬁrm and worker and can be considered as
performance pay (see Lemieux et al. (2007)). If we would include unemployment beneﬁts, w ≥ b
would have to hold.
5
Table 2: The Eﬃciency Wage Game
F/W C N
C (y-w),w-e -w,w
N y,-e 0,0
If ﬁrm and worker cooperate, the ﬁrm receives the output and has to pay the
"extra" wage, while the worker receives the wage and provides eﬀort (which can not
be used for leisure). If the ﬁrm cooperates, but the worker chooses to non-cooperate,
the ﬁrm has to pay the wage (since it committed on paying the wage) but receives
no output.11 The same considerations hold vice versa for the case (N,C). If both
players choose to non-cooperate, the ﬁrm receives no output and the worker can
spend this eﬀort for leisure, hence generating some amount of utility.
If we now apply the methodology introduced in the precedent section, we infer
that this is indeed a Prisoner's dilemma, since the static (subgame perfect) Nash
equilibrium is (N,N), while 0 < (y − w) and 0 < w − e.
Therefore, we can set up two propositions, such that cooperation is a (subgame
perfect) Nash equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated game, i.e. that ﬁrm and worker
choose to cooperate over the entire game.
Proposition 1
The ﬁrm will cooperate, iﬀ
y ≥ w
φ
. (4)
Proof
See the Appendix.
Proposition 2
The worker will cooperate, iﬀ
w ≥ e
φ
. (5)
Proof
See the Appendix.
We have shown that the eﬃciency wage theory - from a game theoretic view - is
in fact a Prisoner's dilemma and, consistently, we established conditions, such that
cooperation is a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium.
11For the sake of simplicity, we assume an extreme case. However, this assumption leaves our
qualitative results unaﬀected.
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4 Final Remarks
We have shown that from a game theoretic viewpoint, the Akerlof approach is based
upon an implicit assumption of commitability of eﬀort. However, since the game
between ﬁrm and worker is a Prisoner's dilemma, cooperation is per se no (subgame
perfect) Nash equilibrium. We develop conditions for which cooperation is in fact
a Nash equilibrium and consistently show that the Akerlof (1982) eﬃciency wage
theory is nested within the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) theory. Moreover, we can
understand the former approach as a special case of the general game between ﬁrm
and worker, i.e. the latter. With this game theoretic approach, we are able to unify
these two ideas, often viewed as disparate.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁrm will cooperate, iﬀ
y ≥ w
φ
. (6)
Consider the game presented in Table 2. If we apply (3) to this problem, we initially
obtain
(1− φt)(y − w) + φt ((1− φ)y) . (7)
Consistently, the proﬁt of cheating is given by
y − w + φt(w − φy). (8)
However, if cheating should not be proﬁtable, the stream of proﬁts has to be smaller
than the proﬁt from cooperation, i.e.
y − w + φt(w − φy) ≤ y − w. (9)
Applying some algebra yields the condition
y ≥ w
φ
, (10)
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2
The worker will cooperate, iﬀ
w ≥ e
φ
. (11)
The problem for the worker is solved analogously to the ﬁrms problem. Therefore,
the initial condition looks as follows
(1− φt)(w − e) + φt ((1− φ)w) . (12)
Some rearranging gives
w − e+ φte− φt+1w. (13)
The condition for non-proﬁtability of cheating is given by
w − e+ φte− φt+1w ≤ w − e, (14)
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such that
w ≥ e
φ
. (15)
q.e.d.
References
Akerlof, George A.. 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange." Quar-
terly Journals of Economics, (97(4): 543-569.
Danthine, Jean-Pierre and Andre Kurmann. 2004. "Fair Wages in a New
Keynesian Model of the Business Cycle." Review of Economic Dynamics, 7(1): 107-
142.
Danthine, Jean-Pierre and John B. Donaldson. 1990. "Eﬃciency wages and
the business cycle puzzle." European Economic Review, 34(7): 1275-1301.
Lemieux, Thomas, W. Bentley MacLeod, and Daniel Parent. 2007. "Per-
formance Pay and Wage Inequality." NBER Working Paper, No. 13128.
Ratliﬀ, Jim. 1997. Lecture Slides to the Graduate-Level Course on Game Theory.
Available via the following link: http://www.virtualperfection.com/gametheory/.
Shapiro, Carl and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a
Worker Discipline Device." American Economic Review, 74(3): 433-444.
9
